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Introduction
“[C]riminal justice today,” Justice Anthony Kennedy declared, “is for
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”1 Justice Kennedy’s
statement captures the stark reality that 90 percent of all federal criminal
cases are disposed of by the plea bargain.2 Despite the jury trial’s esteemed
placement in the American cultural zeitgeist, the fact remains that in 2010
only 2.8 percent of criminal defendants exercised their right to a jury trial.3
Instead, the vast majority of defendants enter into “the supreme instance of
waiver known to our system of justice:” the guilty plea.4
Until recently, plea-bargaining was dismissed as a “necessary evil,”
and delegated to private spheres shielded from the attention of the judicial
and legislative branches.5 However, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
of Lafler v. Cooper6 and Missouri v. Frye7 demonstrate a profound shift in
1. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012) (arguing against the contention
that a fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea
bargaining).
2. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics, Criminal Defendants Disposed of in U.S. District Courts, tbl. 5.22.2010 (Kathleen
Maguire ed.), available at http://albany.edu/ sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf.
3. Id.
4. See United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 935 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
5. See Lafler at 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the United States, we have
plea bargaining a-plenty, but until today it has been regarded as a necessary evil.”).
6. See id. at 1391 (majority opinion) (holding that counsel’s erroneous advice that led
to defendant’s rejection of a plea bargain constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and
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plea-bargaining law. In both cases the Court deemed defense counsel to
have rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining
process.8 In Lafler v. Cooper, defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by giving erroneous advice that led his client to reject the
favorable plea deal.9 Analogously, in Missouri v. Frye, defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to inform his client of a plea deal
offer that eventually lapsed.10 The Court noted that an examination of these
forfeited rights is necessary because plea-bargaining “is not some adjunct to
the criminal justice system,” but rather “is our criminal justice system.”11
The Court’s next step, following Cooper and Frye, should be to take a
hard look at one of the most pervasive features of the plea-bargaining
process: appellate waivers.12 When a criminal defendant enters a plea of
guilty, he surrenders a plethora of rights, including his right to a jury trial,
his right to face his accuser in a court of law, and his right against selfincrimination.13 More recently and startlingly, criminal defendants are also
forfeiting their statutory right to appeal, as an estimated two-thirds of
federal plea bargains contain appellate waivers.14

the error amounted to prejudice).
7. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410–11 (2012) (holding that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not informing defendant of a favorable plea
deal).
8. See Lafler 132 S. Ct. at 1376 (deeming defense counsel to have rendered
ineffective assistance); see also Frye 132 S. Ct. at 1399 (affirming that the attorney’s
representation was deficient).
9. See id. (“As to prejudice, respondent has shown that but for counsel’s deficient
performance there is reasonable probability he and the trial court would have accepted the
guilty plea.”).
10. See Frye 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (stating that defendant’s attorney was deficient
because attorney did not inform his client of a favorable plea deal before the plea deal
expired).
11. See id. at 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Symposium:
Punishment, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
12. See Editorial Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2012, at A24 [hereinafter Review Me] (noting that waivers are “a common but largely hidden
element of plea bargains”).
13. See G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 89 (3d ed. 2012) (stating that a plea
agreement may result in the defendant’s forfeiture of some constitutional rights such as
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to trial by jury).
14. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209 (Nov. 2005) (“In nearly two-thirds of the cases settled
by plea agreement in our sample, the defendant waived his right to review.”).
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Appellate waivers create unique problems between attorney and client
in a post-waiver situation.15 Critically, waivers may vitiate an attorney’s
obligation to file a client’s requested appeal.16 Therefore, these waivers
may cause defendants to lose two rights: their statutory appeal rights as well
as their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.17
This Note advances that defense counsel renders ineffective assistance
by refusing to file an appeal because of the presence of a waiver. Parts I
and II of this Note will examine the appellate waiver and the circuit split
regarding ineffective assistance in a post-waiver situation. Part III will
argue that § 2255 ineffective assistance waivers are invalid and therefore
should not bar courts from addressing whether an attorney renders
ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal. And finally, Part
IV will argue that counsel’s role as advocate of his client and officer of the
court creates the obligation to file a notice of appeal even in a post-waiver
context.
I. The Appellate Waiver
A. The Right to Appeal
A plea deal begins with an offer by the prosecutor to defense counsel
regarding the disposition of the defendant’s case.18 In order to incentivize
the defendant to plead guilty, the prosecutor makes concessions, like a
reduced sentence recommendation or a dismissal of one of the charges.19
15. See generally infra Part III.B (discussing the ethical dilemma of a defense attorney
allowing a client to sign waiver absolving attorney of any liability).
16. See generally United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008); Nunez v.
United States, 546 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2008).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
18. See generally HERMAN, supra note 13 (discussing the negotiation process between
prosecutors and defense counsel).
19. See id. at 1–2.
Generally, plea negotiations result in one or more of the following: (1)
the prosecutor agrees not to charge the defendant; (2) the defendant
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a reduced charge or lesser included
charge; (3) the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a particular
charge in exchange for the dismissal of other charges; (4) the defendant
pleads guilty or nolo contendere as charged or to a lesser charge in
return for a sentencing concession by the prosecutor; or (5) the
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The defendant will be further incentivized to plead guilty because
defendants who exercise their right to a jury trial typically receive
excessively greater sentences due to the so-called “jury trial penalty.”20
The plea agreement stipulates facts regarding the defendant’s guilt,21
and critically contains a sentencing recommendation.22 In federal criminal
law, a defendant may enter either a Type C plea bargain, which includes a
binding sentencing recommendation, or a Type B plea bargain, which
includes a non-binding sentencing recommendation.23 The majority of plea
agreements are Type B bargains, although commentators have called for a
greater use of Type C bargains.24 As a consequence, the vast majority of
criminal defendants do not know the sentence they will receive and cannot
withdraw their plea after receiving an unanticipated sentence.
A defendant pleads guilty at a plea hearing according to the procedural
and substantive guidelines of Rule 11 of Criminal Procedure.25 Before
accepting the guilty plea, a judge will conduct a plea colloquy meant to
ensure the defendant understands the rights that he is waiving.26 The judge
may choose to accept the plea deal upon determining that the defendant is
knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty.27
defendant enters a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
reserving the right to appeal the judgment and withdraw his plea in the
event that the appellate court affords him relief on the adverse
determination of a specified pretrial motion.
20. See DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
289 (4th ed. 2010).
21. See HERMAN, supra note 13, at 227 (describing how these stipulations of facts are
generally binding on the parties).
22. See id. at 221–29.
23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B)(C).
24. See Shayna M. Sigman, Comment An Analysis of Rule 11 Plea Bargain Options,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317 (1999) (examining the pros and cons of different plea agreements,
especially between Type B and Type C sentence bargain agreements).
25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); see also HERMAN, supra note 13, at 213–14.
26. Id.
27. See HERMAN, supra note 13, at 213–14 (3d ed. 2012).
In federal court, when a defendant enters a plea of guilty – whether as a
“straight” guilty plea, plea of nolo contendere, Alford plea, conditional
plea, or any of the foregoing pursuant to a plea agreement – Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 sets forth procedural and substantive requirements to be
followed by the judge to ensure that the plea is knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea. Rule
11 is addressed to three core concerns: the plea must be free from
coercion; the defendant must understand the nature of the charges
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A defendant’s sentencing hearing takes place at a later date, often
several months later. Although the plea agreement usually contains a
sentencing recommendation, the judge may ignore this recommendation
and exercise his discretion in sentencing the defendant.28 Further, per
United States v. Booker,29 the judge is not bound by the Sentencing
Guidelines.30
Many appealable issues arise during the plea process.31 The United
States Sentencing Commission categorizes appeal rates under nine broad
categories: Reasonableness Issues, 18 U.S.C § 3553 Factors Issues, Drug
Trafficking Issues, Other Non-Guideline Issues, Departure Guidelines
Issues, Criminal History Guidelines Issues, Fraud and Deceit Issues,
Immigration and Naturalization Offenses Issues, and Role in the Offense
Guidelines Issues.32 General substantive reasonableness factors constituted
the most appealed issue.33 The second most popular issue was appealing a
procedural error for the court failing to address or improperly considered
§ 3353 factor.34
Criminal defendants may challenge their conviction or sentence
through two statutory avenues of appeal.35 The first avenue is a direct
appeal under 18 U.S.C § 3742, which permits a defendant to challenge the
validity of his conviction. Section 18 USC § 3742 grants that:
A defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of
an otherwise final sentence if the sentence – (1) was imposed in
violation of the law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines; or (3) is greater than the
against him; and the defendant must understand the consequences of his
plea.
28. See United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145, 1146 (4th Cir. 1977) (“In our opinion
each individual judge is free to decide whether, and to what degree, he will entertain plea
bargains, and his refusal to consider any plea bargaining whatsoever will not vitiate a guilty
plea which has otherwise been knowingly and voluntarily entered.”).
29. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225 (2005) (holding that the
Sentencing Guidelines are discretionary and not mandatory).
30. Id. at 225.
31. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, Sentencing Issues Appealed for
Selected Guidelines, Table 59 (Fiscal Year 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2011/Table59.pdf.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006).

A JUSTIFIED OBLIGATION

147

sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to the extent that the
sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment, probation, or
supervised release than the maximum established by the guideline range,
or includes a more limiting condition of probation or supervised release
under section 3563(b)(6) or (b)(11) than the maximum established in the
guideline range; or (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no
36
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.

Many of the most important recent Supreme Court criminal procedure
decisions are the result of direct appeals.37 Alternatively, the defendant
may file a collateral appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).38 The cases of
Cooper and Frye are both examples of defendants collaterally attacking
their sentence pursuant to a § 2255 motion.39 The right to collaterally
appeal a sentence is such that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is subject to collateral attack, may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.40

B. The Use of Appellate Waivers
An appellate waiver is a provision in the plea agreement whereby the
defendant waives these rights to appeal.41 One study estimated nearly twothirds of plea bargains contain an appellate waiver provision.42 Appellate
waivers grew in popularity after the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,43
36. Id.
37. See United States v. Vanderwerff, 2012 WL 2514933 at 5 (D. Colo. 2012)
(“Indeed, appellate waivers would have insulated from review the underlying convictions in
some of the most notable criminal decisions in the Supreme Court's recent history.”). See
also Nancy J. King and Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing
Policy, 55 Duke L.J. 209, 249 (2005) (noting that waivers would have precluded appellate
review in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004); and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
39. See Lefler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399 (2012).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
41. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 219.
42. Id. at 211.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. (2012).
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which “provided hundreds of new sentencing issues for defendants to raise
on appeal, even after pleading guilty.”44 Facing a wave of appeals,
prosecutors began including appellate waivers in plea-bargain agreements.45
Appellate waivers caught on in the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits and
quickly spread to the other circuits.46 Prosecutors “loved them” and judges
“encouraged them.”47 Today, the appeal waiver is one of the main features
of the plea-bargaining system.48 In fact, the official policy of the
Department of Justice is to “require every defendant who signs a plea
agreement to waive the right to appeal any sentencing error committed by
the sentencing judge.”49
Appeal waivers vary widely in scope. The most common appeal
waiver is the direct appeal waiver, which bars a defendant from appealing
the validity of the sentence he receives.50 Typically, a direct appeal waiver
will instruct that the defendant waives his right to appeal his sentence so
long as his sentence does not extend higher than the upward range.51 The
following is a textual example of a typical direct appeal waiver:
Defendant . . . is also aware that his sentence has not yet been
determined by the Court. Defendant is aware that any estimate of
probable sentencing range that he may have received from his counsel,
the United States, or the probation office is a prediction, not a promise,
and is not binding on the United States, the probation office, or the
Court. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence he will
ultimately receive, Defendant knowingly waives his right to appeal the
sentence in exchange for the concessions made by the United States in
this agreement.52

In addition to a direct appeal waiver, the defendant may agree to a
broader waiver: the collateral attack waiver. A collateral attack waiver
44. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 219–220.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 221.
47. Id.
48. See Jack W. Campbell IV & Gregory A. Castanias, Feature: Sentencing—Appeal
Waivers: Recent Decisions Open the Door to Reinvigorated Challenges, 24 CHAMPION 34
(2000).
49. See id. (citing United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44–45 (D.D.C. 1997)).
50. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 234 (3rd Cir. 2008).
51. See United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant
could not be said to have waived his right to appellate review of a sentence imposed in
excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute . . . .”).
52. See id. at 494 n.1.

A JUSTIFIED OBLIGATION

149

prevents the defendant from raising challenges regarding circumstances
distinct from the legality of the conviction and sentence, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel or prosecutorial abuse.53 An example of a collateral
attack waiver is waiving any right “to challenge any conviction or sentence
or the manner in which the sentence was determined in any collateral
proceeding, including but not limited to a motion brought under Title 28,
United States Code, Section 2255.”54 Collateral attack waivers are
estimated to accompany three-quarters of direct appeal waivers.55 Further,
of these plea agreements containing collateral attack waivers, one–third do
not retain the right to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.56
Consequently, appeal waivers have been demonstrated to bar constitutional
claims including ineffective assistance of counsel claims.57
C. The Costs and Benefits of Appellate Waivers
Ten circuit courts have expressly upheld the use of appeal waivers.58
Reasoning that because a defendant may waive his constitutional rights,
courts declare that a defendant may also waive a statutory right to appeal.59
Circuit courts like the appellate waiver because it has reduced the number
of appeals, thereby easing the burden of a crowded appeals docket. 60 In a
comprehensive study on appellate waivers, Nancy King found that
prosecutors believe that appellate waivers have reduced their appellate
53. See Mabry, 536 F.3d at 234 (discussing the waiver of the right to collaterally
attack the sentence and its consequences).
54. Id. at 233.
55. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 213.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52–54 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827 (8th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Melancon,
972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Hernandez, 134 F.3d 1435 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Fleming, 239
F.3d 761, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001);
United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2001).
59. See United States v. Andis, 552 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 2002); but see United States v.
Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D. Mass 1999) (pointing out that this syllogism “too quickly
assumes that there is no constitutional dimension to the right to appeal . . . . ‘Once a system
of appellate courts is put into place . . . a defendant’s ability to appeal may not be unduly
burdened.’”) (citing United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1996)).
60. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 230.
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burden.61 Further, defendants sometimes view the waiver favorably
because the waiver might give them the benefit of a reduced sentence.62
Despite the benefits, the Supreme Court has not yet approved of
appellate waivers.63 Further, recent district court decisions rejecting pleabargain agreements containing waivers suggest “an opportunity for renewed
challenges to sentencing-appeal waivers.”64 Appeal waivers garner much
criticism.65 Opponents point to the unequal bargaining position between the
United States government and the typical criminal defendant.66 Criminal
defendants not only lack the vast informational advantage of the
government, but most criminal defendants belong to society’s most
vulnerable classes.67 In fact, over 52 percent of federal criminal defendants
in 2011 did not receive their high school diploma and 45 percent were nonUS citizens.68 Thus, appeal waiver opponents suggest that our system of
pleas then “looks more like a system of railroading.”69 In addition to
general fairness concerns, appeal waivers pose unique challenges for
attorneys and their obligation to clients in post-waiver cases.

61. Id.
62. See United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1992) (“We also note that
plea agreements are of value to the accused in order to gain concessions from the
government.”), overruled by United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003); see also
United States v. Elliot, 264 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2011) (“A waiver of appellate rights
can be of great value to an accused as a means of gaining concessions by the government.”).
63. See Alexandra W. Reimelt, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and the Waiver of
the Right to Appeal, 51 B.C.L. REV. 871, 878 (2010). But see also Reimelt at n.73:
Commentators suggest that although the Supreme Court has not ruled on
the issue specifically, its approval of prosecutorial solicitation of waivers
of the protections of Rule 11(e)(6) of the FRCP and Rule 410 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence suggest that the Court would approve the
practice of conditioning pleas on appellate waivers if the issue came
before it.
64. See Campbell & Castanias, supra note 48, at 34.
65. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 211.
66. See Review Me, supra note 12 (describing the plea bargaining process as
“coercion”).
67. See infra, note 68.
68. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2011, Sourcebook of Federal
Sentencing Statistics, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2011/sbtoc11.htm.
69. See Review Me, supra note 12.

A JUSTIFIED OBLIGATION

151

II. Circuit Split Regarding Appellate Waivers
A. Must Defense Counsel File a Notice of Appeal in a Post-Waiver
Situation?
Appeal waivers have caused a significant split among the federal
circuit courts, with criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right caught up
in the fray.70 The issue posed is this: If a criminal defendant signs a waiver
but nevertheless asks his attorney to file an appeal, must the attorney do so?
If the attorney fails to do so, has the attorney rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel?
The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to effective assistance of
counsel and the Supreme Court consistently maintains that the right to
assistance of counsel means the right to effective assistance of counsel. 71 In
order to constitute ineffective assistance, the attorney’s conduct must be
objectively unreasonable, and the attorney’s conduct must have caused
cognizable harm to the plaintiff.72 Furthermore, it is established that a
lawyer who disregards a defendant’s specific instruction to file a notice of
appeal acts in a professionally unreasonable manner.73 However, postwaiver situations have called this well-settled doctrine into question.
B. Flores-Ortega Presumption: Defense Counsel Must File a Notice of
Appeal in a Post-Waiver Situation
Eight circuits maintain that an attorney renders ineffective assistance
by not filing a requested appeal in a post-waiver situation.74 The Court of
70. See generally infra Part II.B–II.C.
71. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (holding that a competently
counseled defendant who alleges that he pleaded guilty because of a prior coerced
confession is not, without more, entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus).
72. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting forth the framework
for judging an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
73. See Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969) (holding a rule invalid since
it makes an indigent defendant (who must prepare his petition under § 2255 without
assistance of counsel) face “the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence”).
74. See United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1195-99 (9th Cir. 2005); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433
F.3d 788, 791-94 (11th Cir. 2005); Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770 (2d Cir.
2006); United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tapp, 491
F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2007); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2007); Campbell
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Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the issue in Campusano v. United
States.75 Jose Campusano was charged with one count of distributing and
possessing with intent to distribute 27 grams of cocaine.76 On November 7,
2001, Campusano entered a plea of guilty.77 At the plea hearing, the
following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Have you discussed with your attorney how the
sentencing guidelines might apply to your case?
THE DEFENDANT: I'm not to [sic] certain about that, but - THE COURT: Have you discussed the sentencing guidelines with your
attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: I've spoken about that but I didn't understand it
that clearly.78

Due to Campusano’s demonstrated lack of understanding, the lower
court adjourned to encourage Campusano’s attorney to discuss the
Sentencing Guidelines with his client.79 The lower court reconvened later
that day and Campusano entered his plea.80 As part of the plea agreement,
Campusano waived his right to directly appeal or collaterally attack the
sentence he would later receive.81

v. United States, 686 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2012).
75. See Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
the per se rule that an attorney who fails to file a requested appeal constitutes prejudice
applies in a post-waiver situation).
76. Id.
77. Brief and Appendix for the Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Campusano v. United States,
442 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5134-pr), 2005 WL 5012245.
78. Id. at 4.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 4–6.
81. See Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 2006). The court
stated:
The relevant language reads as follows: ‘It is further agreed (i) that the
defendant will neither appeal, nor otherwise litigate under Title 28,
United States Code, Section 3355, any sentence within or below the
stipulated Guidelines range set forth above (108 to 135 months) . . . .
Furthermore, it is agreed that any appeal as to the defendant’s sentence
that is not foreclosed by this provision will be limited to that portion of
the sentencing calculation that is inconsistent with (or not addressed by)
the above stipulation.
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Campusano’s sentencing hearing occurred months later on March 26,
2002 and lasted several days.82 At the hearing, the lower court wrestled
with the issue of whether or not to apply a firearm enhancement to
If a firearm enhancement applied, then
Campusano’s sentence.83
Campusano would receive a greater sentence.84 A firearm enhancement
would also render Campusano ineligible for the safety valve exemption,
which would allow him to receive a downward departure of his sentence.85
The relevant rule stated: “[A]djustment should be applied if the weapon
was present unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected
with the offense.”86 The police did seize a gun from Campusano when he
was arrested.87 However, Campusano was not arrested until several months
after the commission of the offense.88 Further, police only seized the
firearm in a search of Campusano’s home incident to his arrest.89 Thus, the
firearm was not present at the time of the crime and firearm enhancement
was not applicable.90
However, Campusano’s attorney failed to emphasize this critical
point.91 Campusano’s attorney skipped over the presence prong, instead
arguing the weapon was improbably related with the offense.92
Campusano’s attorney emphasized witness testimony that Campusano only
possessed the firearm because he took the gun from a neighbor who had
threatened to use the weapon to kill his wife.93 However, the “improbably
related” test was a more difficult hurdle to overcome than the objective
“presence” requirement. The lower court rejected Campusano’s arguments,

82. See Brief and Appendix for the Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Campusano v. United
States, 442 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5134-pr), 2005 WL 5012245 (stating that
sentencing proceedings occurred on March 26, April 18, and May 21, 2002).
83. See id. at 7 (quoting the lower court as stating that it was “deeply troubled” by the
question of whether to apply the enhancement).
84. See id. at 11.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 6.
87. Id. at 1–2.
88. Id. at 1.
89. Id. at 1–2.
90. Id. at 8–9.
91. See id. at 6–7 (stating that Campusano’s attorney “inexplicably failed to argue”
that the gun was recovered months after the date of the charged crime).
92. See id. (arguing the weapon was improbably related with the offense).
93. Id. at 7.
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finding that Campusano’s firearm could be related to his drug activity.94
Campusano received a two-point firearm enhancement, and was
subsequently denied safety valve eligibility.95 Campusano twice asked his
attorney to appeal the decision, but his attorney failed to do so.96
Consequently, Campusano filed a § 2255 collateral attack, alleging,
(1) [C]ounsel’s failure to advance a reasonable argument for the
Petitioner’s ineligibility for exposure to a two-level firearm
enhancement and counsel’s related failure to advise the Petitioner
concerning this enhancement; (2) counsel’s failure to advise the
Petitioner that the application of the two-level firearm enhancement
rendered him ineligible for a two-level “safety valve” reduction; (3)
counsel’s failure to present a reasonable argument for a downward
departure; and, (4) counsel’s failure, in light of the district court’s denial
of the safety-valve reduction and its application of the firearm
enhancement, to follow the Petitioner’s instructions to file a notice of
appeal on his behalf.97

After the district court dismissed Campusano’s ineffective assistance
of counsel motion brought pursuant to § 2255, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reviewed the case.98 The Second Circuit, in an opinion
written by then-circuit judge Sonia Sotomayor, held that Campusano’s
attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file the
requested appeal.99 In so deciding, the court relied on the case of Roe v.
Flores-Ortega.100 The Supreme Court decided in Flores-Ortega that: (1) A
lawyer who disregards a defendant’s specific instructions to file a notice of
appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable; (2) Where
counsel’s error leads to forfeiture of appeal prejudice is presumed; (3)
When counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a defendant is entitled to a

94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. at 11.
96. See Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 2006)
97. Brief and Appendix for the Petitioner-Appellant at 11, Campusano v. United
States, 442 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5134-pr), 2005 WL 5012245.
98. Campusano, 442 F.3d at 775.
99. See id. (“[W]e now hold . . . that where counsel does not file a requested notice of
appeal and fails to file an adequate Anders brief, courts may not dismiss the hypothetical
appeal as frivolous on collateral review.”).
100. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000) (finding that counsel’s failure
to timely file notice of appeal deprived defendant of appellate proceedings altogether, and
was presumptively prejudicial).
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new appeal without showing that his appeal would likely have merit.101
Although Flores-Ortega did not specifically address a post-waiver case, the
Second Circuit took “very seriously the need to make sure that defendants
are not unfairly deprived of the opportunity to appeal.”102 Explaining that
“constitutional protections are endangered” if counsel fails to pursue an
appeal, the court held that “where counsel does not file a requested notice
of appeal and fails to file an adequate Anders103 brief, courts may not
dismiss the hypothetical appeal as frivolous on collateral review.”104 Seven
other circuits also employ the Second Circuit’s reasoning, maintaining that
Flores-Ortega is a per se rule and the presence of an appeal waiver does not
vitiate counsel’s appeal obligations.105
C. Third and Seventh Circuit Conclude § 2255 Waiver Bars Appeal
The Third and Seventh Circuit hold a divergent view from the majority
of courts. In 2008, the Third Circuit first addressed the issue in the case of
United States v. Mabry.106 James Mabry was charged with possession with
intent to distribute cocaine and crack, possession of a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime, and felon in possession of firearm.107 Mabry pleaded
guilty to the charge of possession with intent to distribute in exchange for
the government dismissing the remaining charges.108 In his guilty plea,
Mabry agreed to a very broad appeal waiver, barring both a direct appeal

101. Id. at 470, 471.
102. Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 2006).
103. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (stating that appointed counsel
must, upon determining a case to be wholly frivolous and requesting permission to
withdraw, file a brief referencing anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal).
104. Campusano, 442 F.3d at 775.
105. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2007); Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 358
(6th Cir. 2012); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1195-99 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d
1262, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 2005); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 791-94 (11th
Cir. 2005).
106. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 2008) (enforcing
defendant’s collateral attack waiver and refusing to consider whether defendant’s attorney
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel).
107. Id. at 233.
108. Id.
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and a collateral attack.109 However, Mabry raised serious objections to
issues at his sentencing hearing, and he asked his attorney to file a § 3742
direct appeal to challenge the correctness of the calculation of his sentence
under the Sentencing Guidelines.110 Despite the express instruction to do
so, Mabry’s attorney did not perform the “ministerial task”111 of filing the
notice of appeal.112 Mabry was therefore barred from directly appealing his
sentence.113 Consequently, Mabry filed a § 2255 pro se collateral attack,
arguing his attorney’s failure to file the § 3742 appeal constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.114
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Mabry’s § 2255
petition.115 Rather than focusing on the Flores-Ortega presumption like the
Campusano court, the Mabry court instead hinged the decision on Mabry’s
§ 2255 appeal waiver.116 The court determined that because Mabry had
signed a § 2255 appeal waiver, and the waiver was valid, Mabry’s § 2255
appeal must necessarily be dismissed.117 The Mabry court criticized the
other circuits for their “flawed reasoning” in relying on Flores-Ortega
rather than examining the § 2255 waiver itself: “[The Campusano court]
did not evaluate the validity of the habeas waiver, but instead skipped
immediately to the merits of the argument raised in the § 2255 motion,
namely whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a direct
109. Id. at 238.
110. Id. at 235 (“Namely, (1) a two-point enhancement for possession of a firearm
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1) should not
have been applied; (2) a one-point deduction for acceptance of responsibility should have
been applied; (3) defendant was improperly designated an armed career criminal under
U.S.S.G. §4B1.1; and (4) the criminal history category used by the District Court
substantially overrepresented the defendant’s criminal history.”).
111. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (“[F]iling a notice of appeal is
a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to the defendant’s
wishes.”).
112. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“In the motion, he
complained of counsel’s failure to file an appeal notwithstanding his request that counsel do
so).
113. Id. at 235.
114. Id. at 234.
115. Id. at 244.
116. See id. at 241 (“In any event, we believe that the other courts of appeals that have
considered this issue have applied Flores-Ortega to a situation in which it simply does not
‘fit.’” ).
117. See id. at 244 (finding that Mabry’s waiver was “knowing and voluntary” and that
enforcement would not work a miscarriage of justice).
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appeal.”118 Thus, the Mabry court dismissed the petitioner’s claim on
procedural grounds, and refused to consider the substantive Sixth
Amendment issue. In so deciding, The Third Circuit joined the Seventh
Circuit in finding that a failure to file an appeal does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.119 Because 70% of appeal waivers do not
exempt ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Third and Seventh
Circuit’s mode of analysis poses severe threats to a defendant’s appeal
rights.120
D. Suggested Resolution of the Circuit Split
The circuit split should be resolved in favor of finding that an attorney
renders ineffective assistance for failure to file a requested appeal. Two
points compel this conclusion. First, the right to effective assistance of
counsel should not be waivable, thereby rendering the Third and Seventh
Circuits’ analysis erroneous. Second, an attorney has the obligation to file
the appeal not only because of the Flores-Ortega presumption as described
by the Campusano court, but also because of the attorney’s twin roles as
advocate and officer of the court. Therefore, a criminal defendant may not
waive the enshrined right to effective assistance of counsel and this right
encompasses filing a requested appeal in a post-waiver case.
III. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel is Not Waivable
A. Section 2255 Ineffective Assistance Waivers
The right to assistance of counsel is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution, which mandates that “the accused shall enjoy the right
to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”121 The right is
fundamental to American conceptions of justice, and Supreme Court
decisions continually reinforce the significance of the right.122 Despite the
118. Id. at 240.
119. See Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 456 (7th Cir. 2008) (denying collateral
relief based on defendant’s collateral attack waiver).
120. King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 246.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
122. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399 (2012).
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right’s esteemed placement in our spectrum of liberties, the protection has
been rendered vulnerable by the widespread use of collateral attack
waivers. Approximately one-third of all criminal defendants who enter into
plea-bargain agreements waive their right to effective assistance of
counsel.123
B. Ineffective Assistance Waivers Present Ethical Problems for Defense
Counsel
Supreme Court precedent mandates that a criminal defendant is
entitled to effective assistance of counsel, and this right ensures conflictfree representation.124 In addition to case law, the American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct describe professional
guidelines for attorneys, and the Supreme Court has legitimized these
codified standards as “important guides” for determining standards for
counsel’s performance.125 The Model Rules illuminate the conflict of
interest dilemma that ineffective assistance waivers present to defense
counsel.126
Ineffective assistance waivers violate Model Rule 1.7, which holds
that a lawyer must not represent a client if the representation involves a
conflict of interest.127 A conflict of interest exists if there is a significant
risk that the representation of a client will be materially limited by a
personal interest of the lawyer.”128 By advising a client to waive the right
to bring an ineffective assistance claim, the attorney is limiting his own
personal liability and safeguarding his own personal interests. The best
interest of the client is lost as a result. The Missouri Ethics Body found that
ineffective assistance waivers were unethical, concluding that defense
counsel cannot “provide competent and diligent representation to the

123. King & O’Neill, supra note 14, 213 (“Three-quarters of the defendants in our
sample who waived appeal also waived collateral review; of these, fewer than one-third
preserved the right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
124. See Alabama v. Washington, 53 U.S. 654 (2002); see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“[T]he Court has recognized that ‘the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.”) (quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))).
125. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
127. Id. at R. 1.7 (1983).
128. Id. at R. 1.7(a)(2) (1983).
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defendant regarding the effectiveness of defense counsel’s representation of
the defendant.”129
Ineffective assistance waivers also violate Model Rule 1.8, which
mandates that an attorney shall not make an agreement limiting the
lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice.130 A waiver of ineffective
assistance of counsel is an express agreement that limits the attorney’s
liability, because it forecloses the possibility of the defendant raising any
objections to his attorney’s performance. Thus, an attorney who helps
structure a plea deal containing a waiver, and then advises his client to
agree to such a waiver, creates an unacceptable conflict of interest. Critics
have compared the conflict of interest as “akin to a doctor handing a patient
a liability waiver just as the patient is being wheeled into surgery or, more
aptly, like advising a client regarding an agreement that would limit the
lawyer’s prospective malpractice liability.”131
An ex-ante remedy to this ethical dilemma is for defense attorneys to
prevent their clients from waiving this right.132 State advisory opinions
have in fact stated that attorneys are obligated to not allow their client to
sign these provisions.133 The ex-post remedy is for courts to refuse to
enforce ineffective assistance waivers. Most state ethics bodies that have
considered the issue have decided that collateral waivers are unenforceable
on ethical grounds.134 Federal courts need to follow the example of state
courts and determine that an attorney may not ethically advise his client to
agree to a plea agreement containing such a waiver. Federal courts should
also refuse to enforce a provision that so flagrantly violates the ethical
boundaries of the attorney-client relationship.

129.
130.
131.

Advisory Comm. of the Supreme Court of Mo., Formal Op. 126 (May 19, 2009).
MODEL RULES, supra note 162, at R. 1.8(h)(1) (1983).
Allan Ellis & Todd Bussert, Stemming the Tide of Postconviction Waivers, 25
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2010) (discussing appeal waivers and the ethical constraints placed on
defense attorneys and prosecutors in using these waivers).
132. See id. (“[D]efense counsel should be assertive in seeking revisions to plea
agreements that preserve a client’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. . . .”).
133. See Ellis & Bussert, supra note 131 (“Importantly, the ethics bodies in five of six
jurisdictions, which have considered the question, have issued opinions excluding ineffective
assistance of counsel claims from the scope of permissible post-conviction waivers”).
134. See id.
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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Waivers Violate Defendant’s Due
Process Rights
An ineffective assistance of counsel waiver is not only unethical but
also hardly lawful. Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel at every critical stage of a criminal
proceeding.135 Supreme Court precedent establishes that this right to
counsel extends to the sentencing phase.136 The government violates a
criminal defendant’s due process right by asking the defendant to waive the
fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel.
1. The Supposed Validity of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Waivers
The circuit courts typically uphold ineffective assistance waivers if the
claim does not relate to the decisions leading up the entrance of the plea.
The courts first addressed the validity of ineffective assistance of counsel
waivers by looking at whether § 2255 waivers were generally valid.137 The
Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Wilkes,138 began the analysis by noting that
courts had already enforced the validity of knowing and voluntary direct
appeal waivers.139 A collateral waiver could also be entered knowingly and
voluntarily.140 Finding no logical reason for distinguishing between direct
appeal waivers and collateral waivers, the Fifth Circuit decided that
collateral waivers were valid as well.141 Other circuits similarly enforce
collateral attack waivers.142 Despite this general determination, the Fifth
135. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (“The Sixth Amendment requires
effective assistance of counsel at critical stages of the criminal proceeding.”).
136. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203–04 (2001); see also Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967) (indicating the significant influence defense counsel plays
during a sentencing hearing).
137. See United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (dismissing
defendant’s § 2255 appeal because defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
appeal).
138. See id. at 652 (denying defendant’s motion to vacate his sentence because he
waived his right to post-conviction relief as part of a plea deal).
139. See id. at 653 (“[U]nder the United States v. Melancon . . . , a defendant can waive
his right to appeal as part of a plea agreement if the waiver is informed and voluntary.”).
140. See id.
141. See id. ([W]e see no principled means of distinguishing such a waiver from the
waiver of a right to appeal.”).
142. See Mason v. United States, 211 F.3d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 2000); Watson v.
United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488–89 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,
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Circuit was weary of applying the presumptive validity to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.143 The Ninth Circuit also expressed doubt that
a § 2255 waiver could bar an ineffective assistance claim.144 The Fifth and
Ninth Circuit’s reluctance to extend the validity of the § 2255 waiver to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims evinces a respect for the importance
of the constitutional protection.
Nevertheless, years later the Fifth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit by
expressly holding that a § 2255 waiver could bar ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.145 The Seventh Circuit framed the issue by asking whether
a plea agreement that “waives the right to file a petition under § 2555 bars a
defendant from arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
when negotiating the agreement or that the agreement was involuntary.”146
The court concluded that justice necessitates that “the right to mount a
collateral attack pursuant to a § 2255 survives [a waiver] only with respect
to those discrete claims which relate directly to the negotiation of the
waiver.”147 Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a defendant could not
waive his right to effective assistance of counsel regarding assistance
leading up to the plea. The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Cockerham,148
adopted the Seventh Circuit’s analysis.149 The Tenth Circuit concluded that
the issue is whether the “ineffective assistance tainted the voluntariness of
the plea” or “the waiver agreement itself.”150 Post-plea issues, including
counsel errors at sentencing, did not go to the “voluntariness of the plea” or
“the waiver agreement itself.”151 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cockerham 237 F.3d. 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001);
Latorre v. United States, 193 F.3d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir. 1999).
143. See United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Such a waiver may
not always apply to a collateral attack based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
144. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e do not
hold that [defendant’s] waiver categorically forecloses him from bring any section 2255
proceeding, such as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
145. See United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that
there are some ineffective assistance of counsel claims that should not be immune from
waiver).
146. Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144–45 (7th Cir. 1999).
147. Id. at 1145.
148. See United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001).
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting United States v. Vasquez, 194 F.3d 1321 (10th Cir. 1999)).
151. Id. at 1184.
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that a defendant could validly waive his right to effective assistance of
counsel.152
2. Ineffective Assistance Waivers Violate Due Process
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis creates dangerous implications for
criminal defendants. A criminal defendant is owed the right to effective
assistance of counsel at all “critical stages” of the criminal process.153
Maintaining that a defendant has this unfettered right in pre-plea
proceedings but not post-plea proceedings is an arbitrary distinction that
violates due process.
a. Ineffective Assistance Waivers are Fundamentally Uninformed
Ineffective assistance waivers violate a defendant’s due process rights
because a defendant cannot knowingly waive his right to effective
assistance of counsel. In general, appeal waivers are considered “knowing”
if the criminal defendant knows that he is waiving a right to appeal.154 The
federal courts maintain that the defendant does not necessarily have to
know what claims he is waiving the right to appeal.155 The Ninth Circuit
summarized this distinction, saying, “Whatever appellate issues might have
been available to [defendant] were speculative compared to the certainty
derived from the negotiated plea with a set sentence parameter. He knew
he was giving up possible appeals, even if he did not know exactly what the
nature of those appeals might be.”156
Ineffective assistance waivers are fundamentally different from direct
appeal waivers and should not be deemed “knowing” in the same sense as
direct appeal waivers. Section 2255 waivers often contain broad language
and do not explicitly state that the defendant is giving up his right to
effective assistance of counsel.157 If a defendant agrees in a plea colloquy
152. Id. at 1187.
153. See generally Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012).
154. Reimelt, supra note 63, at 880.
155. See id. (“The U.S. Supreme Court holds that defendants may knowingly and
voluntarily waive even uncertain rights.”).
156. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 913 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1990).
157. See Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that
when asked, Nunez stated that he understood that the waiver covered every issue other than
the voluntariness of the plea).
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not to bring “any motions pursuant to a § 2255 appeal,” the defendant does
not necessarily know that his Sixth Amendment right is implicated. For
example, in Nunez v. United States,158 the Seventh Circuit found that
defendant Nunez waived his right to bring an ineffective assistance claim
because his plea agreement contained a broad collateral attack waiver.159
The Supreme Court remanded the case based on Seventh Circuit’s broad
interpretation of the waiver and asked if the § 2255 waiver necessarily
comprehended an ineffective assistance waiver.160 On remand, the Seventh
Circuit maintained that the broad collateral waiver encompassed an
ineffective assistance waiver.161 As a consequence, the Seventh Circuit
dismissed Nunez’s claim that his attorney’s failure to file his requested
appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.162
Further, a criminal defendant assumes that the plea process will
proceed within constitutional limitations.163 The Fourth Circuit summarizes
this point, maintaining,
Nor do we think such a defendant can fairly be said to have waived his
right to appeal his sentence on the ground that the proceedings following
entry of the guilty plea were conducted in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, for a defendant's agreement to waive
appellate review of his sentence is implicitly conditioned on the
assumption that the proceedings following entry of the plea will be
conducted in accordance with constitutional limitations.164

Therefore, a criminal defendant cannot knowingly waive his right to
effective assistance of counsel because: (1) Section 2255 waivers are often
written in broad and ambiguous language that do not mention effective
assistance of counsel; and (2) A criminal defendant will assume the plea
proceedings will proceed within constitutional limitations.

158. Nunez v. United States, 495 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 544 U.S. 911
(2008).
159. Id.
160. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, n.15 (3d Cir. 2008).
161. See Nunez, 546 F.3d at 453 (“Because the plea was voluntary, the waiver of appeal
must be in force. And that waiver knocks out Nunez’s argument that his lawyer failed to
follow his direction to file an appeal.”).
162. Id.
163. See United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that waiverof-appeal provision in the plea agreement does not bar an appeal).
164. Id.
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b. Ineffective Assistance Waivers are Involuntary

Ineffective assistance waivers also violate due process because a
criminal defendant cannot voluntarily relinquish his right to effective
assistance of counsel. The majority of circuits maintain a rather narrow
interpretation of voluntary, holding that it means that the defendant cannot
be coerced into agreeing to an appellate waiver provision.165 The defendant
must not have been under threat or coercion, the defendant must not have
been fed false promises, and the defendant must be mentally competent and
not under the influence of drugs to the extent his judgment was impaired.166
However, ineffective assistance waivers implicate constitutional
considerations and demand a different analysis. The example of Michael
Powell provides an illustration of the unacceptable unfairness of the
waivers.167 In 1999, Powell, an indigent defendant in extremely poor
health, pled guilty to selling drugs and waived the right to directly appeal or
collaterally attack his sentence.168 Powell was diagnosed with kidney
disease at the age of 18, underwent dialysis three times a week, and needed
a kidney transplant.169 Such a severe medical condition qualified Powell for
a downward departure of his sentence.170 However, Powell’s defense
counsel failed to move for a downward departure that is explicitly reserved
for this type of situation.171 If Powell’s attorney had competently argued
for the downward departure, Powell could have received the mandatory
minimum of six months.172 Instead, Powell was sentenced to 136 months
imprisonment.173 Thus, defense counsel’s lack of adequate representation
at sentencing resulted in Powell serving six years longer than he would
have under the downward departure.174 Moreover, Powell was powerless to

165. G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING (3d ed. 2012).
166. See id. at 11–13.
167. See Brief for Appellant Michael Powell at 4, United States v. Powell, 251 F.3d 155
(3d Cir. 2000) (No. 99-3962) 2000 WL 34024438 (explaining that defendant pled guilty to
“conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine”).
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. at 34.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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challenge his attorney’s ineffective assistance because he signed a collateral
waiver.175
Michael Powell’s guilty plea did not strip him of his right to competent
counsel. Rather, much of defense counsel’s most important work for his
client occurs at the sentencing hearing. In a system where barely 3 percent
of defendants plead “not guilty,” the guilt/innocence phase of the plea
bargain process is often trivial.176 What really matters to the client is not
the entrance of guilty or not guilty, but how much time he will have to
serve. As the American Bar Association concludes:
It is unfortunately too often the case that the defense attorney considers
his job completed once he has assisted the defendant through the guilt
phase of the proceedings and perhaps jock-eyed for the most lenient
sentencing judge…. Many lawyers view their functions at sentencing to
involve superficial incantations of mercy; others merely to seek the
lightest possible sentence without much concern for the real needs of the
defendant. . . . [However], for many convicted defendants the sentence
will be the most important and the only really difficult issue in the
case.177

It is not in the defendant’s self-interest to give a free pass to his
attorney to render ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing
hearing. Accordingly, such a waiver is inherently involuntary, and
inclusion of the waiver violates a defendant’s due process rights.
Therefore, ineffective assistance waivers are invalid because such
provisions violate a defendant’s due process rights and contravene legal
ethics.
IV. Attorney’s Failure to File Appeal Constitutes Ineffective Assistance
The right to effective assistance of counsel is not a waivable right, and
this right encompasses an attorney filing a requested appeal in a postwaiver case. Three reasons compel this conclusion. First, as already
described, the Supreme Court case of Roe v. Flores-Ortega178 requires an
175. See United States v. Powell, 251 F.3d 155 (Table) (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming the
judgment of the trial court).
176. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS Table 9 (2009),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf.
177. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES,
241–248 (1968) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
178. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (holding that Strickland v. Washington,
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attorney to file for an appeal upon the express instruction to do so.179
Second, the attorney’s role as advocate necessitates that he safeguards the
rights of his client.180 Third, the attorney’s role as officer of the court
appeals means that he helps protect the integrity of the criminal justice
system.181
A. Attorney’s Role as Client’s Advocate
An attorney’s role as advocate compels that he files an appeal in a
post-waiver situation. As an advocate, attorneys are endowed with the
responsibility of zealously protecting the rights of their client, and the right
to appeal is one such right.182 It is true that a criminal defendant who has
signed an appeal waiver faces a small chance of appellate success.183
However, attorneys who do not file a requested appeal foreclose the
possibility of vindicating any wrongs done to their client.184 Further, courts
have not only carved out exceptions to enforcing appeal waivers, but the
jurisprudential landscape is also continuing to evolve.185 Consequently,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides the proper framework for evaluating a claim that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal).
179. Id.
180. See MODEL RULES, supra note 162, at pmbl. (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.”)
181. See id. at R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (“This rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as
officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the interest of the adjudicatory
process.”).
182. See MODEL RULES, supra note 126.
183. See Reimelt, supra note 63, at 879 (noting that the majority of courts uphold the
validity of appeal waivers).
184. See Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 772–73 (“Although applying the
Flores-Ortega presumption to waiver cases would bestow on most defendants nothing more
than the opportunity to lose the second circuit would not cut corners where Sixth
Amendment rights are at stake.”); see also Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 358
(6th Cir. 2012):
We made clear that the failure to perfect a direct appeal, in derogation of a defendant’s
actual request, is a per se violation of the sixth amendment. Consistent with FloresOrtega, we also indicated that such a violation occurs without regard to the probability
of success on appeal because such a failure on the attorney’s part deprives the defendant
of any counsel whatsoever, for purpose of the Strickland analysis, prejudice must be
presumed.
See also Campbell 686 F.3d at 358 (“Even where an appeal appears frivolous, an attorney’s
obligations to his or her client do not end at the moment the guilty plea is entered.”).
185. See infra Part IV(A)(2).
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attorneys would be remiss to fail to file a notice of appeal because they
could be surrendering a client’s meritorious claim.
1. Exceptions to Enforcement of Appellate Waivers
Appellate waivers are not enforced in certain circumstances.186 Such
circumstances include: the sentence imposed is in excess of the statutory
maximum,187 the plea proceedings violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel,188 the waiver was involuntary,189 the sentence was
influenced by a constitutionally impermissible factor like race190 or
naturalized status,191 or the sentence imposed diverges from the sentence
agreed to in the plea agreement.192 Ineffective assistance of counsel
waivers, as previously discussed, will also not be enforced if the ineffective
assistance pertained to the plea negotiations.193
In addition to these outlined exceptions, the Second, Fourth, and
Seventh Circuits have also added a catch-all qualifier, the so-called “whim
qualifier.” The Fourth Circuit explained, “[a] defendant who waives his
right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the
whim of the district court.”194 Further, the First Circuit, Third Circuit, and
Tenth Circuit also prescribe to the idea that an appellate waiver will not be
enforced if doing so would result in a “miscarriage of justice.”195 The
Tenth Circuit attempted to explain this vague phrase, noting that it includes
situations: “(1) where the district court relied on an impermissible factor
such as race, (2) where ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with
the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, (3) where the
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or (4) where the waiver is
186. See supra notes 140–145.
187. United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 729–32 (4th Cir. 1994).
188. Id.
189. United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).
190. United States v. Hicks, 129 F.3d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1997).
191. United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994).
192. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 326 (9th Cir. 1990).
193. See supra Part III.C(1).
194. United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding, however, that
the defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal his sentence as part of
his plea agreement precluded him from challenging his sentence that departed upward
twelve months from guidelines).
195. See United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001); see also United
States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2001).
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otherwise unlawful.”196 However, the fourth prong itself of “otherwise
unlawful” is vague. A competent advocate could very well argue that his
client’s waiver constitutes a miscarriage of justice, or that a sentence was so
outrageous that it should fall under the “whim” exception.
2. Evolution of “Knowing and Voluntary” Conceptions
Importantly, several judges have “broken ranks” from the normal
conception of the “knowing and voluntary” test, and argued that giving up
one’s right to appeal can never be knowing and voluntary.197 For example,
in United States v. Raynor, District Judge Friedman articulated that:
[A] defendant can never knowingly and intelligently waive the right to
appeal or collaterally attack a sentence that has not yet been imposed.
Such a waiver is by definition uninformed and unintelligent and cannot
be voluntary and knowing. Until the sentence is imposed, the defendant
cannot possibly know what it is he or she is waiving. A plea that
requires such a waiver of unknown rights cannot comport with Rule 11
or the Constitution.198

The court went on to explain the uninformed nature of appellate
waivers:
[W]hen a defendant gives up the right to a trial in favor of a plea, he or
she knows that there will no longer be twelve jurors sitting in judgment,
that there will no longer be live testimony and the right to confront
witnesses, and that there will be no speedy and public trial . . . . When a
defendant waives the right to appeal a sentence, however, he or she is
freed of none of the uncertainties that surround the sentencing process in
exchange for giving up the right to later challenge a possibly erroneous
application or interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines or a
sentencing statute. [Such errors could include the court] mak[ing]
incorrect, unsupportable factual findings with respect to the amount of
drugs involved, the nature of the relevant conduct to be considered or

196. United States v. Bell, 437 Fed. Appx. 658, 663 (10th Cir. 2011).
197. Campbell & Castanias, supra note 48, at 34 (“Three recent district court
decisions—two from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and one
from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts—have broken rank
with this body of precedent, presenting an opportunity for renewed challenges to sentencingappeal waivers.”).
198. United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.D.C. 1997) (citations omitted).
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whether . . . [the] defendant[] was involved in more than minimal
planning with respect to the narcotics conspiracy to which they pled. 199

In United States v. Melancon, District Judge Parker made a persuasive
case for an appellate waiver never being knowing, saying, “What is really
being waived is not some abstract right to appeal, but the right to correct an
erroneous application of the Guidelines or an otherwise illegal sentence.” 200
Judge Parker continued, “This right cannot come into existence until after
the judge pronounces sentence; it is only then that the defendant knows
what errors the district court has made . . . .”201
Recent Supreme Court decisions give further weight to the criticism of
the knowing and voluntary test. In United States v. Booker,202 the Court
held that the Sentencing Guidelines were not mandatory, but
discretionary.203 Now a defendant signing a sentencing-appeal waiver does
not even know that the judge must sentence him within certain defined
parameters. Furthermore, the cases of Frye and Cooper demonstrate that
the Court is concerned that plea bargain defendants receive a fair
sentence.204 In light of Frye and Cooper, at least one district court judge
has rejected a plea bargain because it contained an appellate waiver.205
As more criticism is launched at courts and as more judges break
ranks, the “knowing and voluntary” test evolves. This evolution paves the
way for dedicated attorneys to create pathways to the non-enforcement of
appellate waivers. Defense counsel owes a duty to their clients to file
requested appeals on the chance that the appeal is meritorious.

199. Id. at 44.
200. United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 571 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J.,
concurring specially).
201. Id. (emphasis omitted).
202. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 249–50 (2005) (holding that the federal
sentencing guidelines were subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement).
203. Id. at 259 (excising the provision of the Federal Sentencing Act that made the
federal sentencing guidelines mandatory).
204. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (finding that defense counsel
has the “duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms
and conditions that may be favorable to the accused”); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.
1376, 1391 (2012) (holding that the correct remedy for counsel’s ineffective assistance in
advising defendant to reject a plea offer was to order the State to reoffer the plea agreement).
205. See United States v. Vanderwerff, 2012 WL 2514933 at 6 (D. Colo. 2012) (stating
that although favorable sentencing consequences might have induced Vanderwerff’s
acceptance of the plea bargain, they did not justify inclusion of an appellate waiver).
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B. Attorney’s Role as Officer of the Court

In addition to being advocates, attorneys are officers of the court.206
As officers of the court, attorneys must work within their proper role as
defense counsel and not usurp the role of the judge. Further, attorneys must
help promote the integrity of the justice system by working to ensure
criminal defendants receive fair and just sentences.
1. Proper Division of Power in the Courtroom
The judicial system relies on a proper division of power between
prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge. Appellate court judges exercise
the unique right to decide whether or not an appeal has merit.207 An
attorney does not have the right to determine if an appeal should be granted.
Accordingly, even when an attorney believes his client’s appeal would be
frivolous, he may not ignore the client’s direction.208 Rather, the attorney
must file an Anders brief with both the court and the client, requesting to
withdraw but referring to “anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal.”209
In United States v. Gomez-Perez,210 the Second Circuit extended the
Anders brief logic to the post-waiver situation.211 In Gomez-Perez, the
defendant filed a pro se appeal despite the presence of an appellate
206. Powell v. Alabama, 53 S. Ct. 55, 73 (1932); see also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
333, 378 (1866).
Attorneys and counselors are not officers of the United States; they are
not elected or appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution
for the election and appointment of such officers. They are officers of
the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character.
207. See Vanderwerff, 2012 WL 2514933 at 5 (“The responsibility of appellate review
is to decide how well the sentencing judge has established the sentence within this described
discipline.”).
208. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (stating that the court, not
counsel, must decide whether a case is wholly frivolous).
209. Id.
210. See United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
an Anders brief is required in situations where the defendant has executed a waiver of appeal
and then filed his own pro se notice of appeal).
211. See id. (finding that an Anders brief requirement was necessary to ensure that
constitutional rights were not “trampled” by increasing use of appeal waivers in plea
agreements).
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waiver.212 The Second Circuit determined that the Anders brief is still
required in the post-waiver situation.213 Further, the Anders brief in a postwaiver situation must specifically address: “(1) whether the plea and waiver
were knowing, voluntary, and competent; (2) whether it would be against
the defendant’s interest to contest his or her plea; and (3) any issues
implicating rights that cannot be, or arguably were not, waived.”214 By
insisting on an Anders brief even in a post-waiver situation, Gomez-Perez
affirms that the appellate court is the ultimate decider of the merits of a
criminal defendant’s claim.
The Second Circuit extended the Gomez reasoning in the Campusano
case.215 If the attorney is asked to file an appeal that the attorney believes to
be frivolous due to an appellate waiver, the attorney must nevertheless file
the appeal in conjunction with an Anders brief.216 The attorney’s role is that
of the advocate, and the judge’s role is that of deciding the merits of the
case. A proper respect for the division of power in the courtroom demands
that an attorney file a notice of appeal in a post-waiver situation.217
2. Promoting Sentencing Uniformity in the Criminal Justice System
Attorneys are also obligated to file appeals because appeals are
essential in ensuring uniformity and justness in sentencing.218 In 1984,
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act,219 which established the
212. Id. at 317.
213. Id. at 319.
214. Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 2006).
215. See id. at 775 (holding that when defense counsel fails to file a requested notice of
appeal and an adequate Anders brief, courts may not dismiss the appeal as frivolous on
collateral review).
216. See id. at 771–72 (“[E]ven after a waiver, a lawyer who believes the requested
appeal would be frivolous is bound to file the notice of appeal and submit a brief pursuant to
[Anders].”).
217. See United States v. Vanderwerff, 2012 WL 2514933 at 4 (D. Colo. 2012) (“The
pervasive waiver of individual rights has fundamentally altered the function of the courts.
The act of judging, once central to the determination of guilt or innocence, has been shunted
to the margins.”).
218. See id. at 5 (“Indiscriminate acceptance of appellate waivers undermines the
ability of appellate courts to ensure the constitutional validity of convictions and to maintain
consistency and reasonableness in sentencing decisions.”).
219. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §1A1.2 (Nov.
2012). The Guidelines explain Congress’ goal:
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive
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United States Sentencing Commission and set out as its goal to create a
uniform system of sentencing in this country.220 The fact that the
Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory and not mandatory does not
change the underlying goal that criminal defendants receive fair and just
sentences.221
Plea-bargaining can frustrate sentencing justness and uniformity
because prosecutors wield wide discretionary power in determining what
charges to bring and thereby what sentencing levels will be on the table.
Unfairness in sentencing can create disastrous consequences, like
incentivizing a risk-averse innocent defendant to plead guilty.222 A criminal
defendant may feel compelled to take a plea deal because post-trial
sentences, though rarely imposed, are very harsh.223

220.
reforms:

Crime Control Act of 1984) provides for the development of guidelines
that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence,
incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. The Act delegates
broad authority to the Commission to review and rationalize the federal
sentencing process.
See id. §1A1.3 (Nov. 2012). The Guidelines describe three significant sentencing

The Act’s basic objective was to enhance the ability of the criminal
justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing
system. To achieve this end, Congress first sought honesty in
sentencing. It sought to avoid the confusion and implicit deception that
arose out of the pre-guidelines sentencing system which required the
court to impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and
empowered the parole commission to determine how much of the
sentence an offender actually would serve in prison. This practice
usually resulted in a substantial reduction in the effective length of the
sentence imposed, with defendants often serving only about one-third of
the sentence imposed by the court. Second, Congress sought reasonable
uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences
imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar
offenders. Third, Congress sought proportionality in sentencing
through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for
criminal conduct of differing severity.
221. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
222. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[Plea
bargaining] presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an
innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense . . . .”).
223. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011) (“The expected posttrial sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the sticker price for cars:
only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything less
as a bargain.”).
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The story of Erma Faye Stewart, a single mother of two in Hearne,
Texas, presents a human face to this unsettling reality.224 Ms. Stewart was
arrested as part of a large drug bust based upon an informant’s tip to the
police.225 Ms. Stewart was booked in jail and given a public defender.226
Maintaining her innocence, Ms. Stewart pleaded with her attorney to
conduct investigative work to prove her innocence, but her attorney urged
her to take the plea deal.227 Ms. Stewart did not have the money to post
bond, and a jury trial would be scheduled months in advance.228 Worried
about her children, Ms. Stewart pled guilty and was sentenced to ten years
probation and a $1,000 fine.229 The other cases in the “drug bust” went to
trial,230 where the informant was flatly disproven and the cases collapsed.231
All cases were dismissed, except for those defendants who had already
taken the plea deal.232 Unable to find work and saddled with a felony
conviction, probation, court fines, and probation fines, Ms. Stewart lost her
home, and consequently, lost her children to the foster care system.233
Ms. Stewart’s case speaks to the grim reality that plea-bargaining
involves a game of risks. Defendants are incentivized to take plea deals,
even if they maintain their innocence, because of financial desperation or
fears of harsh sentences at trial.234 In fact, the Innocence Project estimates
that 25% of all DNA exonerations involve crimes where the defendant pled
guilty, made an incriminating statement, or delivered an outright
confession.235

224. See Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Go To Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, at SR5.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast June 17, 2004), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/view/.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See HERMAN, supra note 13, at 9 (“[P]leading to a lesser charge, or even as
charged, will be attractive if the plea is exchanged for a sentence that is lighter than would
otherwise be the case if the defendant was convicted at trial.”).
235. False Confessions, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
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The only way to ensure that Congress’ goal of fairness in sentencing is
achieved is through the appellate process. As Judge Kane warned in his
Vanderwerff decision, “Indiscriminate acceptance of appellate waivers
undermines the ability of appellate courts to ensure the constitutional
validity of convictions and to maintain consistency and reasonableness in
sentencing decisions.”236 Thus, the integrity of the judicial system hinges
on appellate review; allowing attorneys to refuse to file appeals undermines
goals of justice.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s recent extension of the right to
effective assistance of counsel to the plea-bargaining process suggests a
shift in the jurisprudential landscape. Plea-bargaining merits closer
scrutiny, and the appellate waiver is one such feature that demands
examination. While the appellate waiver has been approved both by the
federal circuit courts and in practice, limitations should still be placed on
the waiver to ensure defendants are afforded constitutional protections. In
particular, appellate waivers should not alter pre-existing obligations
between defense attorneys and their clients, like the obligation to file a
requested appeal. The Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit
split and find that an attorney renders ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to file a requested appeal in a post-waiver situation.

236.

United States v. Vanderwerff, 2012 WL 2514933 at 4 (D. Colo. 2012).

